Abstract. With the exponential growth of Internet users, various business transactions take place over an insecure channel. To secure these transactions, authentication is the primary step that needs to be passed.
Introduction
Remote user authentication is used to verify the legitimacy of a remote user and it is mandatory for most of the applications like online banking, ID verification, medical services, access control and e-commerce. One among various authentication schemes is password based authentication scheme. In traditional password based authentication schemes, server keeps verification table securely to verify the legitimacy of a user. However, this method is insecure since an attacker may access the contents of the verification table to break down the entire system. Lamport [1] proposed password authentication scheme to authenticate remote users by storing the passwords in a hashed format. Nevertheless, this scheme has a security drawback as an intruder can go through the server and modify the contents of the verification table. To resist all possible attacks on the verification tables, smart card based password authentication scheme has been proposed. This scheme eliminates the use of verification table.
Today, authentication based on smart card is employed continuously in several applications like cloud computing, healthcare, key exchange in IPTV broadcasting, wireless networks, authentication in multi-server environment, wireless sensor networks and many more. Hence, it is necessary that the authentication scheme must be efficient as well as secure enough so that it can be utilized for practical applications.
Contribution of this Paper
Recently, Yang et al. [20] proposed an access control scheme using smart card. This paper demonstrates that Yang et al.'s scheme has following weaknesses: (i) unauthorized user can easily forge a valid login request. (ii) user is not able to choose and change the password freely. (iii) it does not provide mutual authentication, session key generation and early wrong password detection. (iv) it fails to solve time synchronization problem. Further, comparative study of existing schemes is also done on the basis of various security features provided and vulnerabilities present in these schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The existing literature related to smart card authentication schemes is explored in section 2. Section 3 describes a brief review of Yang et al.'s access control scheme using smart card. Security flaws of Yang et al.'s scheme along with comparison of existing schemes based on various security features and attacks are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
Throughout the last two decades, various smart card authentication schemes have been proposed [2, 4, 6-9, 11-13, 15, 17, 20] . However, most of these schemes fail to fulfill the essential requirements of users. Hwang and Li [2] presented a remote user authentication scheme using ElGamal's cryptosystem and claimed that their scheme is free from maintaining verification table and able to resist replay attack. Chan and Cheng [3] found that Hwang-Li's scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack. To improve efficiency, Sun [4] suggested a remote user authentication scheme using one way hash function. However, Hsu [5] proved that Sun's scheme is insecure against offline and online password guessing attacks. To handle these flaws, Chien et al. [6] proposed remote user authentication scheme using one-way hash function. Nevertheless, it exhibits parallel session attack [5] . To defend against insider attack and reflection attack over [6] , Ku and Chen [7] presented an improved scheme which also provides the facility to change the password freely. But, it is found that the scheme is weak against parallel session attack and has insecure password change phase [8] . Further improvement has also been suggested by Yoon et al. [8] . However, the improved scheme remains vulnerable to guessing attack, Denial-of-Service attack and impersonation attack [9] . To remedy these drawbacks, Wang et al. [9] proposed an enhanced scheme. Though, the scheme is weak against guessing attack, denning sacco attack and does not offer perfect forward secrecy [10] .
Das et al. [11] offered a dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme using one way hash function. They claimed that their scheme is secure against ID theft and able to withstand replay attack, forgery attack, guessing attack, insider attack and stolen verifier attack. Though, the scheme is weak against guessing attack [12] and insider attack [12, 13] . Additionally, the scheme is password independent [13] and does not provide mutual authentication [12, 13] . To beat these flaws, Wang et al. [13] suggested an improved scheme. However, Ahmed et al. [14] found that the scheme does not provide security against password guessing attack, masquerade attack and Denial-of-Service attack. An enhanced scheme has also been given to resist password guessing attack, user masquerade attack and server masquerade attack [15] . Nevertheless, the scheme is exposed to password guessing attack, server masquerade attack and lack of password backward security [16] . Song [17] proposed symmetric key cryptography based smart card authentication scheme and claimed that the scheme is able to resist the existing potential attacks. In addition, it provides mutual authentication and shared session key. However, Song's scheme fails to provide early wrong password detection [18] and perfect forward secrecy [18, 19] . Moreover, it does not resist offline password guessing attack and insider attack [19] . All the schemes discussed so far have their pros and cons. Recently, Yang, Jiang and Yang [20] proposed RSA based smart card authentication scheme. The authors claimed that their scheme has the ability to withstand existing attacks. Though, this paper proves that Yang et al.'s scheme is exposed to impersonation attack and does not provide essential features.
Review of Yang et al.'s scheme
This section briefly reviews Yang et al.'s access control scheme using smart card [20] . The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 . The scheme consists of four phases: Initialization phase, Registration phase, Login phase and Authentication phase. Three phases are shown in Fig. 1 . 
Initialization Phase
In this phase, server S generates the following system parameters. N : N = p × q such that p = 2p 1 + 1, q = 2q 1 + 1, where p, q, p 1 , q 1 are all primes. e : Secret key of the system satisfying gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1.
Registration Phase
In this phase, U i selects ID i and submits it to S over a secure channel. Upon receiving the registration request from U i , S selects R i such that gcd(R i , φ(N )) = 1 and computes
di mod(N ) and delivers P W i as well as smart card over secure channel to U i by storing {H(·), N } into smart card memory.
Login Phase
U i inserts the smart card to the card reader and keys in ID i and P W i . The card reader generates a random number r, computes
rt mod(N ) and sends the login request M = {ID i T C c 1 t c 2 } to S.
Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request M = {ID i T C c 1 t c 2 }; S first checks the validity of ID i and T C to accept/reject the login request. If true, S computes t = H(ID i T C c 1 ) and checks whether c 2 e = c 1 t mod(N ) holds or not. If it holds, S accepts the login request M otherwise rejects it. 
Weaknesses present in Yang et al.'s scheme
This section demonstrates the security flaws in Yang et al.'s scheme under the assumption that the attacker is able to intercept all the messages exchanged between U i and S. It is found that this scheme has following weak spots: (i) vulnerable to impersonation attack, (ii) no early wrong password detection, (iii) no mutual authentication and (iv) no session key generation. In addition, this scheme fails to solve time synchronization problem and does not allow users to choose and change the password freely.
Vulnerable to impersonation attack
First, an attacker U A intercepts the login request {ID i T C c 1 t c 2 } transmitted from user U i to server S (as shown in Fig. 2 ). U A gets the current timestamp T A , computes t A = H(ID i T A c 1 ) and finds a value ∆t such that t A = t×∆t. After getting ∆t, U A computes c 2 = (c 2 )
∆t mod(N ) = (P W i ) r×t A mod(N ) and sends forged login request M A = {ID i T A c 1 t A c 2 } to S. Once the request M A is received, S computes t A = H(ID i T A c 1 ) = t A and verifies whether c e 2 = c t A 1 mod(N ) or not which is obviously true. Hence, U A is able to impersonate as legitimate user U i .
No early wrong password detection
To prevent Denial-of-Service attack, password needs to be verified at the user side prior to login request creation. In this scheme, adversary can create invalid login request by entering wrong password which will be detected only at the server side not at the user side. Hence, it leads to Denial-of-Service attack.
No mutual authentication
It is necessary that not only server verifies the legal users, but users also need to verify the identity of the legal server to achieve two way secure communication. In this scheme, only the login request is verified at the server side to verify the legitimacy of the user. Hence, this scheme fails to provide mutual authentication. Further, session key is used to secure the entire communication between them and it must be changed from session to session. In this scheme, there is no session key generation.
In timestamp-based authentication schemes, the clock of the server and all registered user systems need to be synchronized. In addition, transmission delay of the login request needs to be limited. However, it is inefficient from the practical point of view specially for a large network where clock synchronization is hard to achieve. Yang et al.'s scheme fails to solve this problem. Moreover, users are not able to choose the password as per their convenience. They must remember the password issued by the server which causes inconvenience. Further, they are not able to change the password whenever they feel.
Performance comparison
This paper identifies the possible attacks for existing smart card authentication schemes. These include (i) impersonation attack (SA1), (ii) replay attack (SA2), (iii) password guessing attack (SA3), (iv) reflection attack (SA4), (v) parallel session attack (SA5), (vi) insider attack (SA6) and (vii) attack on password change phase (SA7). A comparison is presented in Table 2 based on the ideas given by different authors.
Further, essential security features that have to be offered by any authentication scheme is also spotted out. These features include (i) user chooses the password (SF1), (ii) user changes the password (SF2), (iii) early wrong password detection (SF3), (iv) mutual authentication (SF4), (v) session key generation (SF5) and (vi) free from time synchronization problem (SF6). A comparative [7] Insecure [7] Insecure [5] Insecure [7] NA Ku-Chen [7] Insecure [9] Secure Insecure [9] Secure Insecure [8] Secure Insecure [8] Yoon et al. [8] Insecure [9] Secure Insecure [9] Secure Secure Secure Secure
Wang et al. [9] Secure Secure Insecure [10] Secure Secure Secure Secure
Das et al. [11] Secure Secure Insecure [12] NA NA Insecure [12] , [13] Insecure [14] Wang et al. [13] Insecure [14] Secure Insecure [14] Secure Secure NA Insecure [14] Hao Table 3 on the basis of these security features. From both of these tables, it is clear that none of these schemes offer protection against identified attacks and fulfill the needs of a user.
Conclusion
Authentication is the imperative factor for any scheme that deals with the transmission of secret information over a public network. This paper pointed out that Yang et al.'s scheme has security flaws as an intruder can easily impersonate legal users to pass the authentication phase. Moreover, it does not allow users to choose and change the password freely which results inconvenience from the user's point of view. In addition, it does not provide mutual authentication, session key generation, early wrong password detection and fails to solve time synchronization problem. Hence, the scheme is computationally inefficient as well as insecure for practical applications.
Furthermore, performance comparison of existing smart card authentication schemes is also presented which shows that a lot of work has to be done in this field to provide secure and efficient authentication scheme. Before designing any authentication scheme, the identified security attacks must be taken into consideration along with the requirements desired by the end users.
